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In this paper we provide a positive exercise on past business-cycle correlations and risk 
sharing in the European Union, and on the ability of insurance mechanisms and fiscal 
policies to smooth income fluctuations. The results suggest in particular that while some of 
the new Member States have well synchronized business cycles, for some of the other 
countries, business cycles are not yet well synchronized with the euro area’s business 
cycle, and risk-sharing mechanisms may not provide enough insurance against shocks. 
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On 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) welcomed ten new members: the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. In addition, two other countries, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU on 
January 2007, and other three countries are at various stages of candidacy for membership 
in the EU: Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) has long stressed the importance of 
the synchronization in cyclical economic activity and insurance mechanisms for members 
of a monetary union. At the same time effective insurance mechanisms could offset 
asymmetric shocks eventually affecting the new and the old EU members.  
This study discusses only one of many aspects which are relevant for an assessment 
of the advantages of joining the euro area and of the costs and risks of a premature 
introduction of the euro. It does not discuss in detail many other important determinants of 
a successful participation in the euro area, such as sustainable price stability, sound fiscal 
policies, efficient structural policies and a high degree of price and wage flexibility, which 
are outside the scope of this paper. Indeed, the purpose of the paper is not to draw overall 
conclusions on the benefits and costs of joining the euro area. 
Using annual data for 28 countries (the 12 EMU countries up to the end of 2006, 
one country that adopted the euro in the beginning of 2007, the 3 existing EU countries 
which have not adopted the euro, the 9 new EU members also outside the euro, and 3 
prospective members, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) from 1980 to 2005, we evaluate 
how important these determinants are, within current EMU and in the EU. We use data on 
real GDP, gross national product, national income, disposable national income, private 
consumption and public consumption to evaluate business cycle synchronization and to  
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identify channels of risk-sharing that exist in the EU25 and in EMU. We use fiscal data to 
evaluate the ability of fiscal policies to smooth shocks. 
With regard to the first determinant, the results of the paper show, for the period 
1980-2005, that there is a variety of situations as regards business cycle synchronization.  
  With regard to the second determinant, our results show that, overall and as things 
stand now, in an enlarged EMU the ability to smooth country-specific shocks does not 
increase. In fact, while (for the more recent period 1998-2005) the amount of shock to 
GDP unsmoothed in the current EMU is 63 percent, in an enlarged EMU at 25 members it 
would be 69 percent. However, this result is not driven by the effectiveness of fiscal 
variables, since they seem to work better for stabilisation purposes in an enlarged EMU 
than in the current EMU.  
  However, it should be noticed in this regard that this analysis can provide useful 
indications only in the short to medium term. Moreover, the amount of cross-sectional 
smoothing would increase as EMU and other EU countries could become more 
homogenous in terms of risk-sharing channels. Thus, both business cycle synchronization 
and international risk-sharing are likely to increase as the integration of the new member 
countries' economies within the European Union progresses, and will be further enhanced 














On 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) welcomed ten new members: the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia.  In addition, two other countries, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU on 
January 2007, and other three countries are at various stages of candidacy for membership 
in the EU: Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
As underlined during the accession negotiations, once these countries have 
achieved economic and budgetary results in line with the Maastricht Treaty, they are 
expected to join the single currency (Slovenia joined on January 2007). None of the 
countries requested a dispensation and no ‘opt-out’ options were granted. This means that 
the new (and, eventually, the prospective) EU countries should be considered candidates 
for the euro once they join the EU. 
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) has long stressed the importance of 
the synchronization in cyclical economic activity and insurance mechanisms for members 
of a monetary union.
1  In particular, the higher the correlation of business cycles, the lower 
the stabilization cost of giving up an independent monetary policy.  Intuitively, if a 
member economy’s business cycle is very highly correlated with the union-wide cyclical 
output, then monetary policy conducted by the common central bank will be a very close 
substitute for the country’s own independent monetary policy.  If, on the other hand, the 
economy’s business cycle is weakly correlated (or, worse, negatively correlated) with the 
union’s cyclical output, then the common monetary policy will be a poor substitute for that 
economy’s own independent monetary policy, and may end up actually being 
                                                           
1  The theory was first developed by Mundell (1961) and extended by the contributions of McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969). For some recent contributions see Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro 




destabilizing. At the same time effective insurance mechanisms could offset asymmetric 
shocks eventually affecting the new and the old EU members. 
  This study is a positive exercise on past business cycle correlations and risk 
sharing and discusses only one of many aspects which are relevant for an assessment of the 
advantages of joining the euro area and of the costs and risks of a premature introduction 
of the euro. It does not discuss in detail many other important determinants of a successful 
participation in the euro area, such as sustainable price stability, sound fiscal policies, 
efficient structural policies and a high degree of price and wage flexibility, which are 
outside the scope of this paper. Indeed, the purpose of the paper is not to draw overall 
conclusions on the benefits and costs of joining the euro area. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to evaluate how important these two OCA 
criteria are in the euro area and in the EU. We use annual data on real GDP, gross national 
product, national income, disposable national income, private consumption and public 
consumption to evaluate business cycle synchronization and to identify channels of risk-
sharing that exist in the EU25 and in EMU. We use fiscal data to evaluate the ability of 
fiscal policies to smooth shocks. The results of the paper suggest a variety of situations as 
regards business cycles synchronisation and risk-sharing mechanisms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section Two we present the 
empirical methodology used to evaluate costs from entering in the EMU. Section Three 





2. Empirical Methodology 
2.1. Business Cycle Synchronization 
Business cycle measures are obtained by detrending the series of real GDP. Four 
different methods are used to detrend the output series of each country i and estimate its 
cyclical component. Letting ( ) t i t i Y y , , ln = , the first measure is simple differencing (growth 
rate of the real GDP): 
        1 , , , − − = t i t i t i y y c .                                              (10) 
The second and the third method use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, proposed by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1980). The filter decomposes the series into a cyclical ( ) t i c ,  and a 
trend  ( ) t i g ,  component, by minimizing with respect to  t i g , , for the smoothness 
parameter 0 > λ  the following quantity: 
 














1 , 1 ,
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, , λ .                                    (1) 
 
The methods differ because the second one consists of using the value 
recommended by Hodrick and Prescott for annual data for the smoothness parameter (λ ) 
equal to 100, while the third method considers the smoothness parameter (λ ) to be equal 
to 6.25. In this way, as pointed out by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
produces cyclical components comparable to those obtained by the Band-Pass filter. 
The fourth method makes use of the Band-Pass (BP) filter proposed by Baxter and 
King (1999), and evaluated by Stock and Watson (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2003) (who also compares its properties to those of the HP filter).  The Low-Pass (LP) 
filter  ) (L α , which forms the basis for the band pass filter, selects a finite number of 
moving average weights  h α  to minimize:  
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The LP filter uses  ) (ω α K  to approximate the infinite MA filter  ) (ω β . Defining 
) ( ) ( ) ( ω α ω β ω δ − ≡ , and then minimizing Q, we minimize the discrepancy between the 
ideal LP filter ) (ω β  and its finite representation  ) (ω α K  at frequency ω . The main 
objective of the BP filter as implemented by Baxter and King (1999) is to remove both the 
high frequency and low frequency component of a series, leaving the business-cycle 
frequencies. This is obtained by subtracting the weights of two low pass filters. We define 
L ω  and  H ω , the lower and upper frequencies of two low pass filters, as respectively eight 
and two for annual data. We therefore remove all fluctuations shorter than two or longer 
than eight years. The frequency representation of the band pass weights becomes 
) ( ) ( L K H K ω α ω α − , and forms the basis of the Baxter-King filter, which provides an 
alternative estimate of the trend and the cyclical component. 
The three filters yield substantially similar results, with only minor differences (for 
example, differencing generally produces the most volatile series, while the BP the 
smoothest). This robustness will be formally assessed by the estimations of the empirical 
section. 
Finally, we measure business cycle synchronization for each country as the 
correlation between the country’s cyclical component and EMU’s cyclical component, ci: 




2.2. Risk Sharing and Insurance Mechanisms 
  In order to quantify the grade of risk-sharing through different channels, we follow 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) and decompose GDP into different income national aggregates all 
closely tied to GDP: Gross National Product (GNP), Net National Income (NI), Disposable 
National Income (DNI), and Total (private and public) Consumption (C+G): 
 
GDP-GNP  = international income transfers (factor income flows),                        (4) 
GNP-NI      = capital depreciation, 
NI-DNI       = net international tax and transfers,  
DNI-(C+G)  = total saving. 
 
If a shock hits the economy of one country, modifying the value of the GDP, the 
economic system will smooth the shock if some counter-cyclical factor can perform this 
task.  






















⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = .     (5) 
 
If only GDP varies after the shock, while the other aggregates are unchanged, then 
full stabilisation has been obtained. If GDP varies and GNP remains unchanged, on the 
other hand, then stabilisation is achieved in the first stage by the international net transfers 
of income factors. Conversely, if GNP varies and NI remains constant, then cyclical 
smoothing is provided by the capital depreciation. Finally, if the total consumption also 
changes, it means that a share of the shock is not smoothed.  
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In principle, all these factors (except capital depreciation) have a counter-cyclical 
smoothing effect. The first aggregate expresses the international transfers of the income 
that is earned by foreign entities in each country. The second aggregate is the capital 
depreciation, usually calculated as a constant part of the total amount of capital. Thus, 
since the capital-to-output ratio is typically counter-cyclical, depreciation will constitute a 
large fraction of output in recessions and a smaller fraction in boom periods, resulting in a 
higher cross-sectional variance of NI with respect to GNP. The third aggregate is based on 
the mutual insurance between the countries. Finally, the fourth aggregate represents 
consumption smoothing. 
In particular, from equation (5) it is possible to derive
2 the following system of 
independent equations (with time fixed-effects): 
 
m
t i t i
m m
t t i t i GDP GNP GDP , , , , log log log ε β α + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆                    
d
t i t i
d d
t t i t i GDP NI GNP , , , , log log log ε β α + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆  
g
t i t i
g g
t t i t i GDP DNI NI , , , , log log log ε β α + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆                          (6) 
   ()
s
t i t i
s s
t t i t i GDP G C DNI , , , , log log log ε β α + ∆ + = + ∆ − ∆  
              ()
u
t i t i
u u
t t i GDP G C , , , log log ε β α + ∆ + = + ∆  
 
where the index i  () N i ,..., 1 =  denotes the country, the index t  ( ) T t ,..., 1 =  indicates the 
period and  t α  stands for time fixed-effects.  
 The  β coefficients measure the incremental percentage amount of smoothing 
achieved at each level of the GDP decomposition, and ∑ =1 β . In particular, β
u
 is the 
percentage of shock that remains unsmoothed; β
m is the percentage of shock smoothed by 
                                                           
2 See Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Arreaza et al. (1998).  
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factor income flows; β
d represents capital depreciation smoothing (or dis-smoothing); β
g is 
the amount of shock smoothed by international transfers; β
s measures consumption 
smoothing. Thus, if β
u=0, then there is full risk-sharing. Moreover, each coefficient has no 
constraint, so it can be either larger than 1 or negative (dis-smoothing). 
  The time fixed-effect captures year-specific impacts on growth rates. To take into 
account autocorrelation in the residuals, we assume that the error terms in each equation 
and in each country follow an AR (1) process. We also allow for country-specific variance 
of the error terms, since GDP is typically more variable for small countries. In practice, we 
estimate the system (6) using a two-step General Least Squares (GLS) procedure. 
 
2.3. Fiscal Policies 











DNI DNI DNI f




,                                  (7) 
 
where f is the fiscal variable that we examine, we can differentiate between the effect of 
consumption smoothing through fiscal policy and the effect of consumption smoothing 
through private saving.   
Using the same strategy proposed by Asdrubali et al. (1996) that we applied for 
equation (16), we measure the fraction of the shock smoothed via government 
consumption, transfer and taxes at EMU (or EU) level by estimating the coefficient in the 
following panel regression (with time fixed-effects): 
()
f
t i t i
f f




  In particular, the sign in parenthesis would be positive if we consider government 
consumption, transfers or other government expenditures. In contrast, if we consider taxes 
the sign will be negative. 
Again, we assume that the error terms in each equation and in each country follow 
an AR (1) process and we allow for country-specific variances. In practice, we estimate (8) 
using a two-step GLS. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data 
  We use data from the Annual Macro-economic Database (AMECO).
3 The dataset 
covers 28 countries (the 12 current EMU countries, the 3 existing EU countries which have 
not adopted the euro, the 10 new EU members, and 3 prospective members, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey) from 1980 to 2005.  
The income variable we use to determine business cycle synchronization is real 
GDP in 2000 constant prices. Data for real GNP, NI, DNI, C and G are also used to 
estimate the effectiveness of insurance mechanisms
4.
  
Fiscal variables (namely, Direct Taxes, Indirect Taxes, Social Contributions, 
Capital Taxes, Subsidies, Social Benefits, Social Transfers, Government consumption, 
Compensation of Employees, Gross Fixed Capital Formation) are used to estimate the 
effect of fiscal policy on smoothing shocks.
5 
 
                                                           
3 See Annex for a description of data sources and availability. 
4 We use aggregate date in levels for these variables and not in per capita terms in order to make the analysis 
more comparable to the previous section. In fact, in terms of business cycle synchronization we also use as a 
measure of business cycle the growth rate of aggregate GDP. Moreover, since our dependent variables in 
equation (6) are differences of growth rates the use of aggregate level data instead of per capita data produce 
very similar results. 
5 For consistency and since for most aggregates there is not a well defined deflator, we use the GDP deflator 
to express all the variables in 2000 constant prices.   
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3.2. Business Cycle Synchronization 
In Table 1, we calculate the correlation coefficient of each country’s cyclical 
component of real GDP with that of EMU,
6  as a whole, using the HP filter with 
smoothness parameter equal to 6.25.
7 The table considers three different periods of 
analysis. The first is from 1980 to 1992 and considers the EU15 countries. The second is 
from 1993 to 2005 and applies to all 28 countries. The third is the overall period from 
1980 to 2005. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In relation to the overall period, we can see that for most EMU countries business 
cycle is relatively well synchronized, and France is the country with the highest 
synchronization (0.786).  
Looking at the period 1993-2005 it is clear that France shows an almost perfect 
correlation with the EMU economy as a whole. However, comparing the 12 euro area 
countries with the 3 (old) non-euro economies, it is difficult to establish a systematic 
relationship. In fact, Denmark, Sweden and the UK appear to be more synchronized with 
the EMU-wide cycle than some euro area members, such as Greece and Finland.  
The new EU countries show a generally higher synchronization with the EMU than 
the candidate countries. In particular, there are some new EU countries (such as Cyprus, 
Hungary and Malta) already well synchronized with the EMU, and with correlations 
comparable to, or even higher than, those of some of the old members.
8 On the other hand, 
                                                           
6 It is possible to argue that the results of this analysis could be mainly driven by the home bias, due to the 
fact that EMU countries unlike other countries in the sample are already part of the EMU. However, since 
the size of the new and candidate members is very small compared to the EMU members the home bias is 
very negligible. 
7 Even though the estimated correlations vary according to the detrending method used, the implied rankings 
are very similar, regarding the overall period, the highest Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients is 0.936 
(BP, HP6.25) and the lowest is 0.776 (Diff, HP100). For a detailed comparison see Appendix 1. 
8 Comparable results have been found by Artis et al. (2004) and Darvas and Szapáry (2005). Artis et al. 
(2004) focusing on the identification of individual business cycles, through the Band-Pass filter, found that  
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several  new EU countries (such as Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia) exhibit negative 
correlations, as do two of the three prospective EU members (Romania and Turkey).  
Focusing on the 1980-2005 period is again fully feasible only for the old EU 
members, but this can be used to indicate how the correlations have changed for these 
countries, and how they could change for the prospective Member States. The most 
striking fact to emerge from this exercise is that the degree of synchronization with EMU 
has remarkably increased for all countries (with the exception of Germany, where it 
remained broadly similar).
9 This can largely be attributed to the achievement of a more 
integrated market since 1992, and to an increase in trade as pointed out by Furceri and 
Karras (2006). But, perhaps more unexpectedly, the results show that the increased 
synchronization has been at least as large in the non-euro area as in the euro area 
economies. The UK’s business cycle synchronization has seen the most dramatic change, 
rising from -0.137 to 0.594.  The policy implication of this is obvious. Seen from the point 
of view of the whole period, the UK, Denmark, and Sweden are poor candidates for the 
euro, as stabilisation costs would be very high. However, from the perspective of the 
shorter period 1993-2005, the UK and Denmark appear to be highly correlated with the 
EMU, changing the cost calculus. 
In Figures 1 and 2 we compute the rolling-windows estimation for business cycle 
synchronization. Looking at the figures, we can see that while a sort of convergence 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Hungarian and Polish business cycles are similar to the euro area cycle. Darvas and Szapáry (2005) 
investigated the behavior of several expenditure and sectoral components of GDP. They found that GDP, 
industrial production, and exports in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia have achieved a reasonably high degree 
of correlation with the euro area. 
9 Similar results have been found by Angeloni and Dedola (1999), and by Fatás (1997), analyzing different 
time periods. In particular, Angeloni and Dedola (1999) found that output correlation between Germany and 
other European countries clearly increased during 1993-1997. Fatás (1997), using annual employment 
growth rates for regions of France, Germany, Italy and the UK, found that the average correlation with 
aggregate EU12 employment growth has increased from 1966-1979 to 1979-1992.  
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emerges among the EU15 members (even if not smoothly), there is no convergence among 
the new EU and candidate countries.
10  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Additionally, it is worthwhile mentioning that this analysis can only provide a 
useful indication in terms of stabilisation costs in the short to medium term. In fact, as 
Frankel and Rose (1998) show, business cycle synchronization is likely to increase for the 
EU countries once they join EMU. Moreover, EU membership could increase intra-EMU 
trade allowing business cycle to become more synchronized
11. Thus, the ex ante cost to 
join the EMU is likely to be larger than the ex post cost. 
 
3.3. Insurance Mechanisms  
  In Table 2, we present the estimated percentages of shocks to GDP smoothed 
through each channel pointed out in the GDP decomposition in (14), among EMU and EU 
countries
12. In particular, we consider two different sets of EU countries: the old EU 
countries (EU15) and the overall EU countries including also the new ones (EU25). We 
consider again three different periods of analysis. The first is from 1980 to 2005, the 
second is from 1992 to 2005, and the third is from 1998-2005. In this way, we can see how 
the ability of these channels to smooth income fluctuations evolves over time.  
 
                                                           
10 It is important to stresss that many of the new EU member countries have been in a transition period 
during which many institutional changes have been taking place. Thus, it could lead to somewhat misleading 
results to compare these economies with more mature economies. Neverthless, since we focus just on short 
run movements of GDP and not on stuctural changes, our analysis can still offer important indication about 
the process of convergence in business cycle syncronization.  
11 See, for example, Artis and Zhang (1997), Frankel and Rose (1998), Rose and Engel (2002), Fidrmuc 
(2001, 2004), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006), Maurel (2002), and Rose and Stanley (2005). 
12 In Appendix 1, Table A2, we also present the results obtained by OLS using a robust variance and 
covariance matrix. In this way, in fact whenever the panel is balanced, the estimated coefficients sum up to 
100 percent.  
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[Table 2 here] 
 
  Analyzing the overall period from 1980 to 2005, it is immediately apparent that a 
large amount of the shocks to GDP are not smoothed both for the EMU (57 percent) and 
for the EU15 (61 percent) countries.
13 In particular, factor income flows and international 
transfers have a very negligible effect on income smoothing since they absorb respectively 
1 percent (-0.25 percent) and 2.14 percent (2.39 percent) of shocks to GDP among EMU 
(EU15) countries. 
  Capital depreciation provides dis-smoothing (around 6 percent for EMU and 8 
percent for EU15 countries) since it generally constitutes a large fraction of output in 
recessions and a smaller fraction in boom.   
  The only operative smoothing mechanism is consumption smoothing through 
saving.
14 For the EMU countries, and still for the overall period, saving is able to reduce 
39 percent of shocks to GDP, and it reduces 37 percent of the shock among EU15 
countries. Overall, looking at the entire period, it seems that the current EMU is able to 
provide more income smoothing than an enlarged EMU at 15 members.  
  Looking at the period 1992-2005 we can see that income smoothing is increased 
among both EMU and the EU15 countries.
15 In particular, saving is able to smooth a larger 
amount of shock to GDP (around 50 percent for both EMU and EU15 countries), and 
factor income flows provide a small and statistically significant contribution to the amount 
of shock smoothed (around 7 percent for EMU countries and 5 percent for EU15 
countries). Comparing the results among the different sample of countries, we can see that 
                                                           
13 Using the same methodology for the US, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that the amount of interstate risk-
sharing not smoothed is only 25 percent of shocks to gross domestic product. 
14 These results are consistent with those found by Sorensen and Yosha (1998). 
15 This result is consistent with the findings of Giannone and Reichlin (2006), which show that the amount of 
risk-sharing for euro-area countries increased during the period 1980-1998.  
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overall insurance mechanisms work in the same way among EMU and EU15 countries. In 
contrast, they provide less income smoothing among the EU25. In fact, comparing the 
EMU and the EU25, we can see that while for the euro area countries 50 percent of the 
shock is not smoothed, for the EU25 countries 64 percent of income fluctuations are not 
absorbed. This implies that insurance mechanisms work better in the current EMU than in 
an enlarged EU at 25 members.  
  The same conclusions emerge if we repeat the same comparison for the period 
1998-2005. Moreover, it is also true that for all subsets of countries, the amount of 
consumption-smoothing through saving is remarkably reduced, thus implying a larger 
amount of unsmoothed shock.   
  It is important to notice that the period 1998-2005 provides more useful 
indications in terms of income smoothing comparison between the actual EMU and an 
enlarged EMU than the other periods. In fact, for this period our panel data set is fully 
balanced, which means that the amount of risk-sharing in each country enters with the 
same weight in the computation of the total amount of shock to GDP that is not smoothed. 
Thus, it would seem that, overall, in an enlarged EMU the ability to smooth country-
specific shocks is softened. 
  Again, it is also worthwhile mentioning that this analysis can only offer some 
useful indications in terms of stabilisation costs only in the short to medium term. As EMU 
and other EU countries become more homogenous in terms of the channels investigated in 
our analysis, the amount of cross-sectional smoothing may well increase. In fact, the 
potential for risk sharing is likely to increase as the integration of the new member 
countries' economies within the European Union progresses, and will be further enhanced 
when they join the EMU. For example, recent evidence shows an increased degree of risk  
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sharing across euro area countries since the 1990s, which however does not reach the level 
observed for US states (see Giannone and Reichlin, 2006). 
 
3.4. Income Smoothing and Fiscal Policies 
  In Table 3 we present the estimated percentages of shocks to GDP smoothed 
through fiscal policies among EMU, EU15 and EU25 countries.
16 This table also considers 
the three different periods of analysis (1980-2005, 1992-2005, and 1998-2005). In this 
way, we can see how the ability of these channels to smooth income fluctuations evolves 
over time.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
  Analyzing the overall period from 1980 to 2005, we can see that both for EU15 and 
EMU countries, the largest amount of smoothing provided by fiscal variables is 
represented by social benefits (around 7 percent for the EMU countries and 9 percent for 
the EU15 countries). Government consumption tends to vary positively but less 
proportionally with GDP (particularly in EMU), which reduces the correlation of total 
consumption (private and public) with GDP, thereby contributing to consumption 
smoothing. Compensation of employees also contributes to smooth consumption, 
especially for the EU15 countries.  In contrast, direct taxes, indirect taxes, capital taxes, 
gross fixed capital formation and social contributions provide dis-smoothing. 
It is also interesting to note that the ability of the fiscal variables to smooth income 
is almost unchanged over time. In fact, both the amount of dis-smoothing provided by 
                                                           
16 For consistency we present in Appendix 1 the OLS results using a robust variance and covariance matrix. 
For related work on the ability of fiscal policy to smooth income fluctuations in federations or monetary 
unions see, for example, Bayoumi, and Prasad (1997), Goodhart and Smith (1993), Hammond and Von 
Hagen (1995), Masson and Taylor (1992), Obstfeld and Peri (1998), Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Von 
Hagen  (1998), and Mélitz and Zumer (2002).  
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direct and indirect taxes, gross fixed capital formation and social contributions
17 and the 
amount of smoothing provided by social benefits and government consumption has 
slightly decreased over time.  
More relevant to the point of this paper, we can see that comparing the three areas 
for the periods 1992-2005 and 1998-2005, fiscal policies seem overall to perform better in 
terms of income smoothing in the EU25 than in the EU15 and in EMU. Thus, at least in 
terms of the effectiveness of fiscal policies in providing income smoothing, an enlarged 
EMU at 25 members may represent a better alternative than the current one.
18 This result is 
consistent over the two different periods of analysis.  
In conclusion, we can see that analyzing the result of this section with those 
previously obtained, the larger amount of un-smoothed shock in the EU area with respect 
to the EMU area, cannot certainly be imputed to fiscal policies. In contrast, fiscal policy 
seems to work better for stabilisation purpose in an enlarged EMU.  
 
4. Conclusion 
On 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) welcomed ten new members in addition, 
two other countries. In addition, two other countries joined the EU on January 2007. As 
underlined during the accession negotiations, once these countries have achieved economic 
and budgetary results in line with the Maastricht Treaty, they are expected to join the 
single currency. 
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) has long stressed the importance of 
the synchronization in cyclical economic activity and insurance mechanisms for members 
of a monetary union. With regard to the first determinant, the results of the paper show a 
variety of situations in the EU.  
                                                           
17 In the period 1998-2005 social contributions were able to smooth 5 percent of the shock to GDP in EMU. 
18 It is worthwile noticing that Social Benefits and Government Consumption taken together contributed to 
approximately 50 percent of total consumption smoothing  in the period 1998-2005.  
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  With regard to the second determinant, our results show that, overall and as things 
stand now, in an enlarged EMU the ability to smooth country-specific shocks does not 
increase. In fact, while (for the last period 1998-2005) the amount of shock to GDP 
unsmoothed in the current EMU is 63 percent, in an enlarged EMU at 25 members it 
would be 69 percent. However, this result is not driven by the effectiveness of fiscal 
variables, since they seem to work better for stabilisation purposes in an enlarged EMU 
than in the current EMU.  
  However, it should be noticed in this regard that this analysis can provide useful 
indications only in the short to medium term. Moreover, the amount of cross-sectional 
smoothing would increase as EMU and other EU countries could become more 
homogenous in terms of risk-sharing channels. Thus, both business cycle synchronization 
and international risk-sharing are likely to increase as the integration of the new member 
countries' economies within the European Union progresses, and will be further enhanced 






























Annex – Data Sources 
 
 




AMECO codes * 








National income at current market prices - National currency: Data at current prices 
 
1.0.0.0.UVNN 
National disposable income - National currency: Data at current prices 
 
1.0.0.0.UVNT 









Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government ESA 1995 - 




Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government ESA 




Social contributions received; general government ESA 1995 - National currency: 
Data at current prices 
1.0.0.0.UTSG 
 




Final consumption expenditure of general government ESA 1995 - National 









Social benefits other than social transfers in kind; general government ESA 1995 - 
National currency: Data at current prices 
1.0.0.0.UYTGH 
 
Compensation of employees; general government ESA 1995 - National currency: 




Gross fixed capital formation; general government ESA 1995 - National currency: 












Table A2 – Data availability 
  GDP GNP  NI DNI  C+G DT  IT  SC CT  S  SB GC CE  GFCF 
BEL  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
DEU  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
GRC  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988  1988 
ESP  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995  1995 
FRA  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
IRL  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1980 1985  1985 
ITA  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
LUX  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990  1990 
NLD  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
AUT  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
PRT  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
FIN  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
CZE  1990  1992  1992 1992 1990 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992  1992 
DNK  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
EST  1993  1993  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993  1993 
CYP  1990  1990  1980 1995 1995 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998  1998 
LVA  1990  1990  1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990  1990 
LTU  1990  1993  1993 1993 1990 1993 1993 1995 1997 1993 1995 1990 1993  1993 
HUN  1991  1993  -  -  -  1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999  1999 
MLT  1991  1991  1998 1998 1980 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998  1998 
POL  1990  1991  -  -  1990 1990 1990 1990 1993 1990 1990 1990 1990  1990 
SVN  1990  1990  1990 1990 1990 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 
SVK  1992  1993  1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993  1993 
SWE  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993  1993 
GBR  1980  1980  1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980  1980 
BGR  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  - - - - - - - -  - 
ROM  1990  1990  -  -  1998 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995  1995 
TUR  1980  1980  1980  1980  - - - - - - - - -  - 
Note:  In the table is reported the first year where the data is available. 
(-) means missing. 
GDP=gross domestic product; GNP= gross national product; NI=national income; DNI=disposable national 
income; C+G=total (private and public) consumption; DT=direct taxes; It=indirect taxes; SC=social 
contributions; CT=capital taxes; S=subsidies; SB=social benefits; GC=government consumption; CE= 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 – Business cycle synchronisation (vis-à-vis EMU) 
 
HP6.25  1980-1992  1993-2005  1980-2005 
   EMU 
Austria   0.534  0.793  0.647 
Belgium   0.692  0.832  0.762 
Finland   0.582*  0.478  0.509* 
France   0.615  0.977  0.786 
Germany   0.763  0.678  0.696 
Greece   0.601  0.441  0.554 
Ireland   0.285  0.645  0.465 
Italy   0.539  0.810  0.674 
Luxembourg   0.419  0.745  0.570 
Netherlands   0.542  0.875  0.692 
Portugal   0.341  0.733  0.507 
Spain   0.506  0.871  0.662 
   Other EMU 
Czech Republic     0.031    
Denmark  0.043  0.569  0.258 
Estonia     -0.220    
Cyprus     0.541    
Latvia     0.238    
Lithuania     -0.032    
Hungary     0.789    
Malta     0.698    
Poland     0.247    
Slovenia     0.412    
Slovakia     -0.673    
Sweden  0.164  0.695  0.443 
UK  -0.137  0.594  0.042 
   Candidate countries 
Bulgaria     0.342    
Romania     -0.242    
Turkey      -0.273    
 
              Note: HP6.25=Hodrick-Prescott Filter with smoothness parameter equal to 6.25. 












Table 2 – Channel of output smoothing (GLS) 
 
 EMU   EU 15  EU 25
^    
   1980-2005 1992-2005 1998-20051980-2005 1992-20051998-2005 1992-2005 1998-2005
Factor Income ( β
m)  1.07  6.64
**  13.64
***  -0.25  4.98
*  11.78
***  -0.39  6.44 
   (0.48)  (2.29)  (2.85)  (-0.13)  (1.88)  (2.58)  (-0.31)  -2.87 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [315]  [184] 
-6.30
***  -2.46
*  -2.20  -7.58
***  -3.05
**  -2.81  -3.81  -9.26 
(-4.04)  (-1.85)  (-1.05)  (-5.67)  (-2.45)  (--1.47)  (-1.64)




   [300]  [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [308]  [183] 
2.14  -1.09  1.34  2.39
**  -0.79  1.59  -2.7
*  0.97 















   (6.50)  (6.21)  (2.62)  (6.97)  (6.83)  (2.86)  (5.74)  (5.36) 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [368]  [210]  [120]  [298]  [182] 










   (11.68)  (10.52)  (11.25)  (14.11)  (10.98)  (10.46)  (5.90)  (15.61) 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [302]  [182] 
 
Notes: Fraction of shocks (percentage points) absorbed at each level of smoothing. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets.  
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
m β  is the two-step GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of  GNP GDP log log ∆ − ∆  on 
GDP log ∆ , 
d β  is the slope in the regression of  NI GNP log log ∆ − ∆  on  GDP log ∆ , 
g β  is the 
slope in the regression of  DNI NI log log ∆ − ∆  on  GDP log ∆ , 
s β  is the slope in the regression of 
() G C DNI + ∆ − ∆ log log  on  GDP log ∆ , and finally
u β  is the slope in the regression of 
() G C DNI + ∆ − ∆ log log  on  GDP log ∆ . We interpret the β coefficients as the incremental 
percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each level. And thus 
u β  is the amount of shock not 
smoothed. The sum of the coefficient could not sum to 100 percent due to rounding, due the fact that for 
some regression we have an unbalanced panel and that our estimates are GLS. 
^ It includes all the EU25 countries with the exception of Poland and Hungary for which data are not 
available. See the Annex for a detailed description of the data availability for each country with respect to the 




















Table 3 – Fiscal Channels of output smoothing (GLS) 
 
      EMU        EU 15     EU 25
^ 
   1980-2005 1992-2005 1998-20051980-20051992-2005  1998-2005  1992-2005  1998-2005
Direct Taxes  -4.21  -4.21  -3.16  -3.12  -3.72  -2.08  -4.27
*  -0.21 
   (-1.38)  (-1.37)  (-0.80)  (-1.04)  (-1.23)  (-0.54)  (-1.88)  (-0.08) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Indirect Taxes  -3.23
*  -2.44  2.42  -2.62  -2.89  1.39  -3.10
*  0.78 
   (-1.71)  (-1.06)  (-0.71)  (-1.44)  (-1.32)  (0.41)  (-1.63)  (0.03) 






**  3.52  -5.51
***  -1.31 
(-3.15)  (-2.33)  (2.08)  (-2.64)  (-2.20)  (1.58)  (-3.60)  (-0.68) 
Social 
Contributions 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Capital Taxes  -0.21  -0.14  -0.85  -0.01  -0.05  -0.07  -0.04  -0.17 
   (-0.93)  (-0.44)  (-0.25)  (-0.75)  (-0.19)  (-0.26)  (-0.25)  (-0.49) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Subsides  0.94  -0.24  -0.21  0.11
*  -0.31  -0.04  -0.74  1.37 
   (1.21)  (-.042)  (-0.37)  (1.63)  (-0.53)  (-0.71)  (-1.51)  (0.26) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 









   (4.02)  (3.07)  (2.47)  (5.11)  (3.42)  (3.03)  (5.16)  (4.27) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
3.42






(1.82)  (1.13)  (1.25)  (3.50)  (2.14)  (1.63)  (3.82)  (3.29) 
Government  
Consumption 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
2.09
*  1.36  -0.64  3.59
***  2.56
**  0.07  5.91
***  5.45
*** 
(1.91)  (1.25)  (-0.34)  (3.31)  (2.24)  (0.40)  (4.92)  (3.45) 
Compensation of  
Employees 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
-2.21
**  -1.88  -5.72
***  -2.29
**  -1.82  -5.45
***  0.15  -3.81
*** 
(-2.23)  (-1.61)  (-3.51)  (-2.39)  (-1.55)  (-3.27)  (0.19)  (-3.18) 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation  [262]  [164]  [96]  [401]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
 
Notes: Fraction of shocks (percentage points) absorbed at each level of smoothing. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets. 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
^ It includes all the EU25 countries with the exception of Poland and Hungary for which data are not 
available. See the Annex for a detailed description of the data availability for each country with respect to the 


















Figure 1 – Business Cycle Synchronization vis-à-vis the EMU (1980-2005) 
 
Business Cycle Syncronization EU15 
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  Note: each period is nine years long. 1=1980-1988, 2=1981-1989,…, 18=1997-2005. 
 
   
 
Figure 2 – Business Cycle Synchronization vis-à-vis the EMU (1992-2005) 
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Appendix 1 – Additional Results 
 
Table A1 – Spearman’s rank correlation matrix  
 
 HP6.25  HP100  BP    Diff 
HP6.25  1.000     
HP100 0.936 1.000     
BP   0.847  0.855  1.000   
Diff  0.839 0.776 0.788 1.000 
 
 
Table A2 - Channel of output smoothing (OLS) 
 
 EMU   EU 15  EU 25
^    
   1980-2005 1992-2005 1998-20051980-2005 1992-20051998-2005 1992-2005 1998-2005
Factor Income ( β
m)  7.79  12.67
*  23.46
***  6.22  11.56
*  23.68
***  -1.16  10.64
*** 
   (1.35)  (1.93)  (3.06)  1.20)  (1.81)  (3.25)  (-0.28)  (3.03) 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [315]  [184] 
-6.85
*  -1.95  -1.36  -7.39
**  -2.33  -0.28  8.17  -12.25
*** 




    [300]   [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [308]  [183] 
-3.49  -12.43  -10.55  -2.49  -11.75  -10.23  -8.17
**  -3.68 












**  43.04  32.80
*** 
   (6.23)  (2.88)  (2.60)  (6.34)  (2.90)  (2.60)  (1.00)  (5.63) 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [368]  [298]  [120]  [298]  [183] 







***  41.72  72.40
*** 
   (11.89)  (7.57)  (12.28)  (10.68)  (7.83)  (13.45)  (0.59)  (16.06) 
   [300]  [168]  [96]  [375]  [210]  [120]  [302]  [184] 
 
Notes: Fraction of shocks (percentage points) absorbed at each level of smoothing. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets. Robust standard errors for Heteroskedasticity 
and AR (1).  *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
m β  is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of  GNP GDP log log ∆ − ∆  on  GDP log ∆ , 
d β  
is the slope in the regression of  NI GNP log log ∆ − ∆  on  GDP log ∆ , 
g β  is the slope in the 
regression of  DNI NI log log ∆ − ∆  on  GDP log ∆ , 
s β  is the slope in the regression of 
() G C DNI + ∆ − ∆ log log  on  GDP log ∆ , and finally
u β  is the slope in the regression of 
() G C DNI + ∆ − ∆ log log  on  GDP log ∆ . We interpret the β coefficients as the incremental 
percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each level. And thus 
u β  is the amount of shock not 
smoothed. The sum of the coefficient could not sum to 100 percent due to rounding, due the fact that for 
some regression we have an unbalanced panel. 
^It includes all the EU25 countries with the exception of Poland and Hungary for which data are not 
available. See the Annex for a detailed description of the data availability for each country with respect to the 








Table A3 – Fiscal Channels of output smoothing (OLS) 
 
      EMU        EU 15     EU 25
^ 
   1980-2005 1992-2005 1998-20051980-20051992-20051998-2005  1992-2005  1998-2005
Direct Taxes  -4.94
**  -2.76  -4.74  -3.49  -1.75  -2.02  -6.11**  -0.21 
   (-2.23)  (-0.88)  (-0.91)  (-1.55)  (-0.57)  (-0.36)  (-2.75)  (-0.08) 
   [270]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Indirect Taxes  -3.75
*  -1.99  -3.19  -2.73  -2.07  -2.67  -4.27
**  -2.55 
   (-1.83)  (-0.60)  (-0.76)  (1..27)  (-0.66)  (-0.68)  (-2.21)  (-0.87) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
-5.95  -3.10  5.82  -5.59  -3.63  4.33  -8.96
***  -3.73 
(-1.69)  (-1.24)  (1.86)  (-1.72)  (-1.47)  (1.51)  (-4.96)  (-1.51) 
Social 
Contributions 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Capital Taxes  -0.33  -0.54  0.53  -0.18  0.01  0.44  0.14  0.05 
   (-0.94)  (-0.11)  (0.64)  (-0.68)  (0.19)  (0.60)  (0.63)  (0.16) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Subsides  1.52  0.31  0.58  1.61  -0.01  0.23  -1.52  1.41
** 
   (1.21)  (0.46)  (0.94)  (1.47)  (-0.17)  (0.45)  (-1.40)  (2.48) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Social Benefits  10.90  8.09  4.38
*  11.35




   (1.72)  (1.59)  (1.96)  (2.06)  (1.55)  (1.71)  (7.10)  (4.31) 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]   [287]  [182] 
6.62  3.48  2.82  7.55
*  4.28  3.31  14.91
***  10.43
*** 
(1.65)  (1.34)  (0.77)  (2.08)  (1.65)  (0.99)  (4.87)  (3.62) 
Government  
Consumption  
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]   [287]  [182] 
3.85  1.38  -1.98  4.76  2.30  -0.94  8.38
***  5.47
*** 
(1.23)  (1.13)  (-0.94)  (1.68)  (1.73)  (0.44)  (5.52)  (3.02) 
Compensation of  
Employees 
   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
-2.47
**  -2.48  -4.69
***  -2.78
**  -2.67  -3.92
**  1.09  -2.74
*** 




   [262]  [164]  [96]  [317]  [204]  [120]  [287]  [182] 
Notes: Fraction of shocks (percentage points) absorbed at each level of smoothing. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets. Robust standard errors for Heteroskedasticity 
and AR (1). 
*, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
^ It includes all the EU25 countries with the exception of Poland and Hungary for which data are not 
available. See the Annex for a detailed description of the data availability for each country with respect to the 
variables considered in the analysis. 
 
 
 